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Europe has largely been absent from the US-dominated debate surrounding the
introduction of nudge-type interventions in policy-making. As the EU and its Member
States are exploring the possibility of embracing nudging, it appears desirable to
reframe such a debate so as to adapt it to the legal and political realities of the
European Union.
Besides a few isolated initiatives displaying some behavioural considerations
(e.g. consumer rights, revised tobacco products directive, sporadic behavioural
remedies in competition law), the EU has not yet shown a general commitment
to systematically integrate behavioural insights into policy-making. Given the
potential of this innovative regulatory approach to attain effective, low-cost and
choice-preserving policies, such a stance seems inadequate, especially when
measured against growing citizen mistrust towards EU policy action. At a time in
which some EU countries are calling for a repatriation of powers and the newly
established European Commission promises to redefine – in the framework of its
Better Regulation agenda – the relationships between the Union and its citizens,
nudging might provide a promising way forward. Much of this promise stems from
the two ‘seductive dimensions’ of nudging: nudging as politics and nudging as
applied social science.
Nudging as politics
By injecting a new understanding of where a given policy problem lies (behaviour)
and why this prompts regulatory action (behavioural market failure), nudge-type
interventions are set to expand the toolbox of the EU regulator. Reliance on these
additional, soft and minimalist forms of intervention may potentially contribute to
reallocate the competences between the EU and Member States to the advantage of
the latter.
Nudging as applied social science
At the same time nudging carries the potential to inject a culture of testing and
experimentation into EU policymaking. Rather than relying on anecdotal evidence or,
what is worse, ideologies or emotions, behaviourally informed intervention requires
evidence basis than conventional regulation. As such, nudging belongs to a broader
trend aimed at incorporating evidence into policymaking in order to invest limited
public funding into those policies that ‘work’. That is where the major promise of
behavioural regulation lies in relation to EU policymaking today: a more evidence
informed approach to policy development.
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Challenges ahead
There exist, however, significant legal as well as practical limitations constraining
the ability of the EU to nudge its citizens through choice architecture. This should
not come as a surprise. If nudging raises a number of significant concerns – be they
about its legitimacy, legality or effectiveness – when it is performed by a nation state,
it appears intuitively more difficult when it is a supranational entity, like the EU, doing
the nudging.
One must first observe that, largely due to the composite nature of its administration,
the EU – in contrast to any other jurisdiction – has virtually no direct contact with
its citizens. This is true for at least three reasons. First, most of the competences
requiring states to interact with their citizens, such as taxation, welfare, defense,
public health or education, have not been transferred to the Union, but remain in
the hands of its Member States. Second, even when it comes to policy areas of
EU competence, in the absence of a specific delegation of enforcement power to
the Union, their implementation is primarily the prerogative of the Member States.
As a result, the latter rely on their administrations, rules of procedure and – in the
case of directives – their own solutions when ensuring the implementation and
enforcement of EU actions. Third, as a result of the decentralized nature of the EU
as an administration, the provision of administrative services – even those governed
by the EU – to citizens is generally provided by the Member States, rather than by
the EU itself. The EU’s only direct yet patchy relations with its citizens are largely
confined to the management of some of its funding programmes.
More critically, nudging supposes a shared, political understanding of what is ‘good’
in society, or at least of what is permissible and what is not. That’s exactly what,
in principle, any sovereign state does: to decide what an ‘ideal’ or ‘worthy’ citizen
is through the definition of good and bad habits. Yet when applied to the EU, such
an assumption does not hold. The EU shares its citizenry with the Member States
and as a result several visions of what a 'good citizen' is – or ought to be – tend to
compete.
Despite the limited opportunities for the EU to directly affect its citizens, the Union
has over time been increasingly shaping their lives through its legislative, regulatory
and judicial action. In particular, the paired instruments of the internal market and
EU citizenship have allowed the European Union to redefine at the supranational
level what is ‘good’ for its citizens, regardless of the country they come from within
Europe. In the implementation of internal market provisions, the EU has often
elevated certain moral or ethical questions beyond the national level so as to identify
a European ‘correct’ answer to those (e.g. Brüstle). Moreover, in conjunction with
early legislative efforts, the EU has – through its negative integration provisions –
also contributed to shaping the emergence of both national and EU lifestyle policies
in relation to tobacco, alcohol and diets. At the same time, while interpreting EU
citizenship provisions, the EU has progressively marginalized the role of member
states as providers of rights in the EU (e.g. Carpenter).
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Given this trend of progressive Europeanization of the ‘good life’, the question
is therefore whether an EU nudging state might slow down or accelerate this
process. The goal-oriented nature of EU law and its wide reliance on purposive
legal reasoning make it particularly permeable to behaviorally informed approaches.
Also the technocratic character of EU law-making further contributes to its embrace
of nudging-type approaches, as those typically do not require the participation of
citizens. Yet given the dual democratic legitimacy of the EU – which lies in both
representative and participatory democracy –, this top-down, technocratic-like
intervention might prompt resistance to nudging. Unlike in the United States, the
major source of political sensitivity in the European Union is not the paternalistic
nature of the intervention. Rather it is the source of that intervention (EU or national).
Should behaviourally informed approaches be capable of contributing towards the
downsizing of EU action – by limiting its reach or perceived impact on citizens’ daily
life – to the benefit of the Member States, this may pave the way to their success
in the European Union. In other words, the fate of nudging in the EU appears as
intertwined with its political dimension as it is with its social-scientific one.
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